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Approved For Release 2005/04/19 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130024-9

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/04/19 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400130024-9

SECRET



25X1

*C O N T E N T S*

West German Foreign Minister Visits Cairo . . . . .	1
Clerides to Remain as Greek Cypriot Negotiator . . . . .	3
British Tories Launch Pre-referendum Campaign . . . . .	4
International Attention Boosts Spanish Socialist Party . . . . .	5

*A N N E X*

Growing Strength of the Dutch Left . . . . .	7
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April 21, 1975

-i-

SECRET

**SECRET**

25X1

West German Foreign Minister Visits Cairo

During his visit to Cairo last week, Foreign Minister Genscher reaffirmed Bonn's intention to pursue an even-handed policy in the Middle East. In an evident effort to encourage Cairo to pursue a moderate policy, Genscher praised President Sadat's decision to reopen the Suez Canal and to extend the mandate of the UN peace-keeping force.

This was Genscher's first trip to the Middle East and the first to Cairo by a high-level West German official since former Chancellor Brandt visited there last April.

Genscher's public statements reflected Bonn's desire to hew closely to the policy line on the Middle East set forth by the EC at the height of the oil embargo in late 1973. He reviewed and approved this policy guideline with other EC ministers in Dublin prior to his visit to Cairo.

Genscher called for Israeli withdrawal from territory captured in the 1967 war and affirmed the right of all nations to live within secure borders. He added that Bonn will not send military supplies to areas of tension.

Concerning the Geneva Peace Conference, Genscher implied that the Arab states could work out a way to include Palestinian representatives within their delegations. The EC has made a similar suggestion for the European-Arab dialogue, recommending that the Arabs form a single delegation that could include representatives of the Palestinians.

April 21, 1975

-1-  
**SECRET**

SECRET

Genscher and the Egyptians agreed that the representatives of oil-producing and consuming nations should not allow their differences to interrupt indefinitely preparations for another meeting between the two sides. Bonn, however, seems prepared to follow the US lead and resist attempts by the developing states and the oil producers to expand a future energy conference to include a discussion of raw materials.

On the bilateral side, the West German-Egyptian Joint Economic Commission held its second meeting after which Genscher and Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi signed an agreement implementing the second installment of Bonn's three-year development aid program. The West Germans will have provided some \$200 million in aid when the program is completed next year.

25X1

April 21, 1975

-2-

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

Clerides to Remain as Greek Cypriot Negotiator

Glaftos Clerides will continue as negotiator for the Greek Cypriot side in the intercommunal talks, thereby ensuring that the talks will resume as scheduled in Vienna on April 28.

25X1

discouraged by the harsh reaction to his conciliatory speech on April 1. Clerides argued in that speech for a realistic negotiating strategy in the talks and suggested that Greek Cypriots consider accepting the Turkish Cypriot demand for a bi-regional federation in return for Turkish Cypriot concessions in other areas. Makarios has opposed opening the negotiations with such a major concession.

Clerides noted in an April 19 statement, however, that he would be discussing the Turkish Cypriot plan for a bi-zonal federation as well as the Greek Cypriot proposals for a multi-regional federation in Vienna. This suggests that he has persuaded Makarios to consider the Turkish Cypriot plan if the Greek Cypriot proposals are rejected.

April 21, 1975

-3-

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

British Tories Launch Pre-referendum  
Campaign

Apparently putting aside any personal animosities in their effort to keep Britain in the EC, present party leader Margaret Thatcher and former leader Edward Heath appeared on the same platform to launch the Tories' campaign. Although Heath has been the principal party spokesman in parliament on the EC question, Thatcher assumed the dominant role in their recent appearance. The press has called Heath's speeches in parliament and across the country the best he has ever given.

Besides citing several reasons why Britain should remain in the EC, Thatcher said that Britain's departure would be tantamount to denunciation of a treaty, adversely affecting Britain's standing among other nations. She said that even though the Tories dislike the notion of a referendum, they must play an active role in order to preserve the Treaty of Rome. Thatcher's speeches and statements appear to have convinced many skeptics that she has not tempered the Tory policy toward Europe.

The Tories have made a conscious effort not to exploit the differences within the Labor party over the EC issue. Earlier this month, Heath made a statement to this effect, commenting that such action could prejudice Britain's continued membership. Many politicians fear that a slanging match between pro-and anti-marketeers would alienate the voters.

25X1


April 21, 1975

-4-

SECRET

SECRET

25X1



International Attention Boosts Spanish  
Socialist Party

The Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) and its labor union affiliate, the General Union of Workers (UGT), are trying to expand their international contacts to counter the well publicized international activity of the Communist-dominated opposition coalition known as the Democratic Junta.

The visit to Madrid from April 7-10 by a Swedish Socialist delegation at the invitation of the semi-clandestine PSOE and UGT has given these two groups needed exposure at the expense of the rival Popular Socialist Party of Professor Enrique Tierno Galvan. The Swedish delegation stopped off in Madrid on its way home from a visit to Portugal. The Swedes met with PSOE and UGT leaders but had no contacts with most other clandestine groups nor with Spanish government officials. At a press conference, the delegation stated its only purpose was to strengthen ties with Spanish Socialists.

This visit was in return for the trip to Sweden in March of PSOE leader Felipe Gonzalez who attended the Swedish Socialist conference and reportedly was received by the Swedish prime minister. Gonzalez also traveled to Mexico in February where he was received by the Mexican president. No definite increase in financial support from these international contacts has yet been reported, however.

The PSOE has announced that French Socialist leader Francois Mitterrand has accepted an invitation to visit Spain in late May, but premature publicity makes it less certain the trip will take place. The PSOE has also

April 21, 1975

-5-

SECRET

SECRET

invited Germany's Willy Brandt, Italy's De Martino, and France's Regis Debray to visit Spain and reportedly has received tentative acceptance from all three.

The Spanish government may be permitting these unofficial visits to avoid complicating relations with the countries involved. It did, however, pressure West German Foreign Minister Genscher during his recent visit to Madrid not to receive Socialist leaders and to limit his contacts to the tame opposition groups.

Some of the leftist oppositionists are alleging that the PSOE and UGT may be benefiting from Spanish government tolerance because they are the principal opponents of Spanish Communists and the Democratic Junta. Allegations of such links between the PSOE and the Franco regime appear to be smear tactics by the rival opposition groups in an effort to tarnish PSOE's image as an opposition party.

25X1

April 21, 1975

-6-

SECRET



SECRET

25X1



ANNEX

Growing Strength of the Dutch Left

For nearly a decade, a younger, more de-tente-minded generation has been slowly entering the Dutch political scene. This trend has been most apparent in the Labor Party, which is the cornerstone of the present five-party center-left government. The latest congress was the first time the so-called "New Left" has been able to dominate the proceedings and put pressure on the leadership on major policy questions.

For years the younger Socialists have insistently called for a re-evaluation of Dutch membership in NATO. More recently, they have argued for a reduction, if not elimination of any nuclear role by the Dutch armed forces.

Other groups outside the Labor Party share a desire to scale down the military establishment. These include a number of peace movements that are based on the nation's strong Protestant and Catholic traditions. The Pax Christi movement, headed by Cardinal Alfrink, the country's chief prelate, is the most notable.

The depth of anti-NATO sentiment among Dutchmen is difficult to determine. Polls in the late 1960's indicated that 25-35 percent favored eventual withdrawal from NATO, but

April 21, 1975

-7-

SECRET

**SECRET**

last year a survey found that only 9 percent supported this view. The Political Radical Party--one of the five coalition parties--openly advocates complete withdrawal. Although its influence on present government policy is limited, a poll last December indicated that this party would double its strength if early elections were held.

The NATO Issue

While the hard core anti-NATO segment in the Labor Party probably accounts for no more than a quarter of rank and file, most other members distrust the Alliance and view it as a symbol of the cold war. Although not favoring an immediate withdrawal from NATO, this middle group has tended increasingly to sympathize with its more extreme colleagues.

For the last several years, the leftists have focused their criticism on the presence of rightist dictatorships in the Alliance. With the political changes in Athens and Lisbon, however, the leftists have been forced to redefine their opposition. At the latest Labor Party Congress, a resolution was passed calling for a withdrawal from the Alliance if no real progress in detente is made by 1978.

Such resolutions have never been binding on the leadership or the party's representatives in the government. In fact, party leaders should find the most recent demand easier to handle than the earlier calls for democracy in Greece and Portugal. Nevertheless, the passage of these resolutions shows the amount of change since the mid-1960's, when such resolutions would have been roundly defeated by a staunchly Atlanticist membership.

April 21, 1975

**SECRET**

**SECRET**The Defense Issue

Pressures to reduce defense spending in recent years have had a greater impact on Dutch governments. Since coming to power in May 1973, Prime Minister den Uyl and Defense Minister Vredeling, both Labor Party members, have been committed to reorganizing and "modernizing" the armed forces with the goal of cutting expenditures. A Defense White Paper was drafted last year outlining significant reductions for the period 1975-1983. NATO officials strongly criticized the Hague for these proposals.

Most of this pressure for reductions has come from the Labor Party and its two leftist allies in the coalition--the Political Radical Party and the Democrats '66.

Den Uyl and Vredeling have walked a narrow path to prevent their party's defense proposals from antagonizing the leaders of the two Christian parties in the coalition. Parliament approved the White Paper last September, but only after several of the proposals by the leftist parties were rejected or withdrawn by government officials for fear of wrecking the coalition.

The Force Reduction Talks and Nuclear Weaponry

Den Uyl and Vredeling apparently still support the long-term goal of reducing defense costs, but have told NATO officials that no reductions outlined in the White Paper would be implemented as long as progress is being made in the East-West force reduction talks in Vienna. Dutch officials have indicated that should the negotiations stagnate indefinitely or collapse, resistance to domestic pressures will be difficult.


April 21, 1975

**SECRET**

SECRET

One step the government has taken to contain such pressures is to urge that reductions in tactical nuclear weapons and tactical aircraft be discussed in MBFR negotiations.

The Dutch also continue to be one of the leading proponents for additional specialization of tasks in NATO.



Last year, The Hague followed through on its commitment to Washington to modernize the Dutch tactical missile force by purchasing the Lance missile. The Dutch insisted, however, on the version with the non-nuclear warhead.

The Young Socialists want to push the government further in this direction as shown in the numerous resolutions adopted by the Labor Party Congress calling for:

- the removal of nuclear missiles from Dutch soil if reductions in such weapons are not considered in MBFR by 1978;
- considerable reductions in such missiles with the goal of creating a nuclear-free Europe;
- the rejection of an independent European nuclear deterrent and withdrawal from NATO should France establish a nuclear force in Central Europe with the cooperation of West Germany;
- the replacement of the F-104 Starfighter with a ground-support aircraft that does not have a nuclear capability.

April 21, 1975

-10-

SECRET

5X1

25X1

SECRET

### The F-104 Issue

The Starfighter replacement question has been the most emotional of these issues and posed serious problems for the Labor Ministers in the government. After months of agonizing, den Uyl and Vredeling have apparently decided to fulfill the government's obligations to NATO and the four nation-consortium by recommending the purchase of the US F-16--a lightweight aircraft with a nuclear capability.

The cabinet has not yet approved this decision formally, however, and public statements favoring the F-16 by den Uyl, Vredeling and Labor Foreign Minister Van der Stoep have already provoked an outcry from many in the Labor Party who want no replacement at all. A resolution to this effect was only narrowly defeated at the Party Congress.

Cooler heads in the party's parliamentary faction are searching for a compromise. Some have suggested that a smaller number of F-16s be purchased, although defense ministry officials oppose this because the original plan to buy 102 replacement aircraft already means a reduction in the front line fighters available.

### The Political Equation

In attempting to uphold the country's NATO obligations, the moderate Labor ministers have signalled their wish to keep the fragile five-party coalition intact until its mandate ends in May 1977. They are also motivated by the realization that if the government collapses over this issue, early elections might strengthen the positions of the leftists in the Labor Party and the Radical Party.

April 21, 1975

SECRET

**SECRET**

With sufficient determination, den Uyl and Vredeling can probably force their recommendation through because no parliamentary vote will be required. Opponents of the F-16 could table a non-confidence motion against the government or Vredeling, who has already warned that he will resign if the party does not accept his recommendation.

The young Socialists and Radicals will have to weigh the advantage of dumping the F-16 against undermining the government and handing the Catholic and Protestant parties a good campaign issue. Leaders of the Christian parties claim that the results of the recent labor congress may make cooperation in future coalitions impossible.

Although den Uyl and Vredeling should still prevail, the party rank and file has served notice that Party leaders in the next government will have to take their views into greater consideration. Den Uyl seemed to acknowledge this when, in his closing speech at the Congress, he expressed the hope that Dutch membership in NATO would be "put to the test" at the party's congress two years from now, when the party's election program will be drafted.

25X1

April 21, 1975

-12-

**SECRET**